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THE HOUSE THAT TAXPAYERS BUILT: EXPLORING THE
RISE IN PUBLICLY FUNDED BASEBALL STADIUMS
FROM 1953 THROUGH THE PRESENT*
MARC EDELMAN**
Sixty years ago, Cleveland Municipal Stadium was the only pub-
licly funded Major League Baseball ("MLB") stadium in the United
States.' Today, however, most MLB teams play in publicly funded
stadiums. 2 Local governments pay on average between seventy and
eighty percent of the costs of new stadium construction. 3 In addi-
tion, local governments often subsidize the costs of roads and infra-
structure that surround these new stadiums. 4
This imbalance in the relationship between MLB and the
American city has emerged as a result of MLB's successful monopo-
* © Marc Edelman, 2009. Excerpts from this Article have previously
appeared in the following two articles: Marc Edelman, Sports and the City: How to
Curb Professional Sports Teams'Demands for Free Public Stadiums, 6 RUTGERSJ.L. & PUB.
POL'x 35 (2008); Marc Edelman, How to Curb Professional Sports' Bargaining Power
Vis-d-Vis the American City, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 280 (2003). Excerpts from this
Article have also appeared in the following presentations: Marc Edelman,
Villanova Sports & Entertainment Law Journal Symposium: The House that
Taxpayers Built (Oct. 25, 2008); Marc Edelman, Harvard Sports Law Symposium:
New Stadiums (Mar. 13, 2009).
** Assistant professor of law at Barry Law School and former visiting professor
of law at Rutgers School of Law-Camden.
1. See Cleveland Municipal Stadium, http://football.ballparks.com/NFL/
ClevelandBrowns/oldindex.htm (last visited May 6, 2009); see also Cleveland Mu-
nicipal Stadium, http://www.ballparks.com/baseball/american/clevel.htm (last
visited May 6, 2009).
2. See Marc Edelman, Sports and the City: How to Curb Professional Sports Teams'
Demands for Free Public Stadiums, 6 RUTGERSJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 4243 (2008) [herein-
after Sports and the City].
3. See Marquette University Law School Sports Facility Reports, http://law.
marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&pagelD=2630 (last visited May 6, 2009) (not-
ing that the only MLB teams that do not receive substantial amounts of publicly
financed stadium money are the Boston Red Sox (0% public funding), Chicago
Cubs (0% public funding), Los Angeles Dodgers (0% public funding), New York
Yankees (0% public funding), New York Mets (0% public funding), San Francisco
Giants (5% public funding) and St. Louis Cardinals (12% public funding)); see also
John Jasina & Kurt Rotthoff, The Impact of a Professional Sports Franchise on County
Employment and Wages, INT'LJ. SPORTS FIN. 2 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=1 151311.
4. See Nathan Scott, Take us Back to the Ball Game: The Laws and Policy of Profes-
sional Sports Ticket Prices, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 37, 47 (2005) (noting that the
approximate costs of land may range up to $60 million and the costs of infrastruc-
tural improvements may exceed $70 million).
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lization of the premier, professional baseball market.5 Thus, if a
particular host city refuses to build its MLB team a new stadium, the
team's owners could credibly threaten to move to another city, thus
depriving the non-subsidizing city of any access to premier, profes-
sional baseball. 6
This Article explains how MLB club-owners use their control
over the market for premier, professional baseball to demand free
public stadiums. Part I of this Article explains how the United
States has moved from having just one publicly funded MLB sta-
dium (pre-1950s) to having over twenty-five publicly funded stadi-
ums (present). Part II shows how, in recent years, MLB club-owners
have continued to demand more money from their host cities and
how host cities generally succumb to MLB club-owners' demands.
I. THE HISTORY OF PUBLICLY FUNDED BASEBALL STADIUMS
A. A "Brave" New World: Milwaukee Decides to Build a Stadium
for a Team to Be Named Later
Although the Cleveland Indians played their Sunday afternoon
games at Municipal Stadium beginning in 1932, the era of publicly
5. See id. at 37; see also MICHAEL LEEDS & PETER VON ALLMEN, THE ECONOMICS
OF SPORTS 111-12, 154-55 (2d ed. 2005); Rodney Fort, Direct Democracy and the Sta-
dium Mess, in SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND
STADIUMS 149-50 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds. 1997); RODNEY FORT,
SPORTS ECONOMICS 140 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter SPORTS ECONOMICS]; Stadium
Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 952 Before the Sen. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 11 (1999) (statement of Andrew Zimbalist); ANDREW
ZIMBALIST, MAY THE BEST TEAM WIN: BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 123-
24 (Brookings Institution 2003); Marc Edelman & C. Keith Harrison, Analyzing the
WNBA 's Mandatory Age/Education Policy from a Legal, Cultural, and Ethical Perspective:
Women, Men, and the Professional Sports Landscape, 3 NW. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 1, 23, 77
(2008) (indicating that even certain other sports leagues such as the WNBA may at
times act as monopolists).
6. See Sports and the City, supra note 2, at 37, 63; LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra
note 5, at 141;JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY D. FORT, HARD BALL: THE ABUSE OF POWER
IN PRO SPORTS TEAMS 6 (Princeton University Press 1999) [hereinafter HARD
BALL]; see also Marc Edelman, How to Curb Professional Sports' Bargaining Power Vis-d-
Vis the American City, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 280, 280 (2003) [hereinafter How to
Curb].
The mayors of American cities are confronted with a prisoner's dilemma
of sorts. If no mayor succumbs to the demands of a franchise shopping
for a new home then the team will stay where they are. This, however, is
unlikely to happen because if Mayor A is not willing to pay the price,
Mayor B may think it is advantageous to open up the city's wallet. Then to
protect his or her interest, Mayor A often ends up paying the demanded
price.
How to Curb, supra, at 280.
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funded baseball stadiums truly began in the early 1950s. 7 Around
that time, rapid changes in demographics (primarily Americans
moving westward) and the advent of new technologies (particularly
airplanes and the television) resulted in increased demands for
American cities to host MLB teams.8 MLB, however, decided not to
expand into new markets to meet this demand. 9
Frustrated by the inability to secure a MLB team, the city of
Milwaukee decided in 1950 to build a public, multipurpose stadium
even though it did not yet have a team to play there. 10 Upon break-
ing ground on this stadium, city officials immediately offered use of
the stadium, free of rent, to any MLB club-owner that would agree
to move their team to the Brew City.11
After numerous MLB club-owners rejected Milwaukee's offer,
on March 13, 1953, Braves owner Lou Perini announced plans to
move his team from Boston to Milwaukee. 12 This move marked the
first time since the signing of the Major League Agreement in 1903
that a MLB team relocated.1 3 It also marked the true start to MLB's
public stadium era.' 4
B. If You Build It, They Will Come: Other Cities Follow
Milwaukee's Lead in Wooing MLB Teams
The Braves' move to Milwaukee was both daring and unprece-
dented. 15 It also paid immediate dividends.' 6 Not only did Perini's
team receive free use of a new stadium, but the Braves also enjoyed
a new and vibrant fan base. 17 During their first season in Milwau-
kee, the Braves sold 1.8 million tickets - more than six times as
7. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 285; see also Matthew J. Parlow, Publicly
Financed Sports Facilities: Are They Economically Justifiable? A Case Study of the Los Ange-
les Staples Center, 10 U. MiAMi Bus. L. REv. 485, 486 (2002).
8. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 285 (noting that the demand for MLB
teams grew as people moved west and technology increased).
9. See id.
10. See id. (noting that Milwaukee built a multi-purpose stadium without hav-
ing any professional sports teams to play in it).
11. See id.
12. See Milwaukee Braves Info, http://www.milwaukeebraves.info/1953.htm
(last visited May 11, 2009) (noting that National League owners voted 8-0 to allow
the Braves to move to Milwaukee).
13. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 285-86.
14. See id.
15. See Sports and the City, supra note 2, at 39-40.
16. For a further discussion about how the Braves' move paid immediate divi-
dends, see infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
17. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 286.
20091
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many as they had sold during their previous season in Boston.' 8
During each of the next four years, the Braves performed even bet-
ter - enjoying annual attendance figures that each season exceeded
two million fans. 19
Other MLB club-owners took notice of the Braves' success in
Milwaukee and began to pursue their own plans to enter new mar-
kets in exchange for free stadiums.2 0 On September 28, 1953, the
St. Louis Browns (a team that actually had moved to St. Louis from
Milwaukee in 1902) relocated to Baltimore, where they became
known as the Orioles.2 ' Then, the following year, the Athletics left
a shared market in Philadelphia for a new home in Kansas City.2
2
In 1958, both the Brooklyn Dodgers and New York Giants de-
cided to make even more drastic moves - leaving behind their es-
tablished markets in the New York City boroughs in favor of new
and emerging markets in California.2 3 Specifically, the Dodgers
moved to Los Angeles in exchange for the promise of prime real
estate.2 4 Meanwhile, the Giants went to San Francisco with the
hope of landing a new, publicly financed stadium, which the city
eventually built and named Candlestick Park. 25
18. Id.
19. See Baseball Almanac, Atlanta Braves Attendance Data, http://www.base-
ball-almanac.com/teams/bravatte.shtml (last visited May 14, 2009) (tracing the
Braves' attendance statistics from 1877-2008).
20. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 286-87.
21. SeeJAMES EDWARD MILLER, THE BASEBALL BUSINESS: PURSUING PENNANTS
AND PROFITS IN BALTIMORE 79 (UNC Press 1990); HARD BALL, supra note 6, at 15;
Baltimore Orioles, Orioles Timeline, http://baltimore.orioles.mlb.com/bal/his-
tory/timelinel.jsp (last visited May 11, 2009). Under the agreement between
Browns ownership and the city of Baltimore, the team changed its name to the
Orioles and moved into Municipal Stadium - a ballpark that had been built four
years earlier to host minor league baseball. See Memorial Stadium: Ballparks of
Baseball, http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/past/MemorialStadium.htm (last
visited May 6, 2009).
22. See Oakland Athletics, Athletics Timeline, http://oakland.athletics.mlb.
com/oak/history/timeline3.jsp (last visited May 11, 2009). Upon accepting Kan-
sas City's offer to host their team, the Athletics announced that they would play
their games at Municipal Stadium - a stadium that was initially built in 1923 for
both a Negro League team and minor league baseball team, but which city officials
promised to substantially renovate in time for the MLB season. See KC. Municipal
Stadium: Ballparks of Baseball, http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/past/
KCMunicipal.htm (last visited May 6, 2009).
23. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 286-87.
24. See id. (noting that the Brooklyn Dodgers left New York City in return for
premier real estate in Los Angeles).
25. See id. at 286; see also Stadiums of the NFL: Candlestick Park, http://
www.stadiumsofnfl.com/nfc/CandlestickPark.htm (last visited May 6, 2009).
[Vol. 16: p. 257
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol16/iss2/2
THE HOUSE THAT TAXPAYERS BUILT
C. Show Me the Money: MLB Clubs Begin to Demand Subsidies
from their Current Host Cities
As each of these five MLB teams thrived in their new markets,
other cities began to request MLB teams as well; however, MLB
club-owners decided not to expand into these markets. 26 Though
expanding into new markets would have allowed the existing MLB
club-owners to obtain lucrative franchise fees from new ownership
groups,27 not expanding proved to be even more profitable because
it allowed the existing club-owners to extort huge subsidies from
their current host communities, which feared that if they did not
pay these subsidies, they would lose their teams to other cities that
were willing to pay them.28
From a MLB club-owner's standpoint, the only real risk of not
expanding was that it opened the door for an entirely new baseball
league to form in these untapped markets. Indeed, in 1959, New
York lawyer William Shea and former Dodgers general manager
Branch Rickey announced plans to launch a rival baseball league,
which they planned to call the Continental League, and which
would have placed teams in New York City to replace the Dodgers
and Giants, as well as in other cities that had recently been denied
expansion teams.2 9 However, ultimately, in August of 1960, it was
agreed that the Continental League would not launch subject to
MLB's promise to expand its total number of teams from sixteen to
twenty-four. 30 Since then, due to the high fixed costs of launching
26. See generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 12-22 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing the law
of supply and demand).
27. See, e.g., JOHN J. GUTHRIE & FRANK P. JozsA, RELOCATING TEAMS AND Ex-
PANDING LEAGUES IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: How THE MAJOR LEAGUES RESPOND TO
MARKET CONDITIONS 49 (Greenwood Publishing Group 1999) (noting that in 1969
MLB's National League added two new teams, the Montreal Expos and San Diego
Padres, for franchise fees of $13 million).
28. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 5, at 96; HARD BALL, supra note 6, at 19-20; see
also Dennis Zimmerman, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Tax
Exempt Bonds and the Economics of Professional Sports Stadiums CRS-3 (May 29, 1996),
available at https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/302/96-
46019960529.pdPsequence=1.
29. See SPORTS ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 134.
30. See JEROLD J. DUQUETTE, REGULATING THE NATIONAL PASTIME: BASEBALL
AND ANTITRUST 53-54 (Praeger Publishers 1999); JAMES P. QUIRK & RODNEY D.
FORT, PAY DIRT: THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 479-87 (Princeton
University Press 1997) [hereinafter PAY DIRT] (explaining that MLB added eight
new teams in the years from 1962-69, with new teams beginning play in New York
City; Houston; San Diego; Montreal; Los Angeles; Washington, D.C.; Seattle and
Kansas City); SPORTS ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 134, 148 (discussing how leaving
viable locations without teams increases the risk of new leagues forming).
2009]
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a new league, no other group has put forth a serious proposal to
compete directly against MLB.
3 1
II. PUBLICLY FUNDED BASEBALL STADIUMS TODAY
Since MLB's last wide-scale expansion in the 1960s, 32 a new se-
ries of on-hold cities have emerged seeking to acquire MLB
teams. 33 These cities include Charlotte, NC; Las Vegas, NV; Nor-
folk, VA; and Portland, OR.34 Consequently, much like in 1960, the
demand to host a MLB team today is once again far greater than
the supply of teams. Hence, American cities continue to fund on
average between seventy and eighty percent of the costs of new
MLB stadiums.35
As compared to the 1960s, however, the American city today
has even less bargaining power in terms of negotiating stadium
agreements. 36 One example of how the American city is worse off
today is that cities today pay a far greater total dollar amount in
subsidies, even after accounting for inflation. 37 For instance, the
most expensive MLB stadium built or refurbished prior to 1968, the
Houston Astrodome, cost taxpayers just $38,000.38 By contrast, the
Washington Nationals' new, publicly funded stadium, which
"[E]xpansion and relocation also protect existing owners from outside competi-
tion." SPORTS ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 141.
31. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 286 (noting that there is a very low likeli-
hood of a new, startup professional baseball league competing against MLB given
the high fixed costs of entry).
32. See Kevin G. Quinn & Paul B. Bursik, Growing and Moving the Game: Effects
of MLB Expansion and Team Relocation 1950-2004, 3 J. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS IN
SPORTS 2, available at http://www.bepress.com/jqas/vol3/iss2/ 4 / (explaining that
since MLB's last major expansion in 1969, MLB has continued to grow gradually,
expanding from twenty-four to thirty teams).
33. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 290.
34. See id.; see also Portland Prepared for Next Team that Moves, ESPN.coM, http:/
/sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=1 8 6 87 2 9 (last visited May 1, 2009).
35. See, e.g., Michael Cunningham, Stadium Deal Just Doesn't Make Sense: Money
Could Be Used on Much More Important Priorities, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 22, 2008,
at IC (evaluating stadium subsidy percentages since 1992); see also ZIMBALIST, supra
note 5, at 96 tbl.1 (detailing expenditures on new sports facilities for professional
teams by decade); SPORTS ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 338 (finding that from 2000
to 2006 the median public contribution for a new sports stadium was sixty-three
percent, and noting that this figure is skewed downward because it includes the
San Francisco Giants' nearly privately financed stadium).
36. For a further discussion about the American city's bargaining power, see
infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
37. See ALEXANDER GARvIN, THE AMERICAN CIT: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T
98 (McGraw-Hall, 2d. ed. 2002).
38. See PAY DIRT, supra note 30, at 161-63.
[Vol. 16: p. 257
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opened in April 2008, cost taxpayers an astounding $611 million.3 9
Meanwhile, the Seattle Mariners' new ballpark, Safeco Field, which
opened in 1999, cost taxpayers $372 million. 40 Also, the Florida
Marlins' proposed new ballpark, which is under construction and
expected to open in 2012, will cost taxpayers an estimated $357
million.41
In addition to the increasing total cost that most MLB cities are
paying toward building new ballparks, MLB club-owners have also
begun to negotiate for themselves a greater share of the revenues
derived from these ballparks - including revenues derived from off-
season events such as concerts, and from the sale of stadium nam-
ing rights. For instance, a covenant in Miami-Dade County's recent
agreement to build a new ballpark for the Florida Marlins will pro-
vide the Marlins ownership group with one hundred percent of the
proceeds from the new stadium's naming rights and non-baseball
related revenues, even though the Marlins club-owners are paying
less than thirty percent of the ballpark construction costs. 42
Finally, MLB club-owners are no longer even willing to share
publicly funded stadiums with National Football League ("NFL")
teams; instead, they are demanding that their host cities build sepa-
rate stadiums for baseball and football.43 Thus, over the past two
decades, most cities with both MLB and NFL teams have obtained
separate publicly funded stadiums, almost always located within a
few blocks of one another.44 Whereas as many as twenty MLB teams
shared their stadiums with local NFL teams in 1989, only three
39. See Eric Fisher, In D.C., Baseball Hits a Crossroads at New Park, STREET &
SMITH'S SPORTS BuS. J., Mar. 10, 2008, at 18.
40. See Marquette University Law School Sports Facility Reports, http://
law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&pagelD=2630 (last visited May 11, 2009).
41. Sports and the City, supra note 2, at 35.
42. Id. at 45.
43. See Editorial, Take Us Out, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Apr. 29, 2008, at
A10 ("Orioles Park at Camden Yards started the trend away from multipurpose
stadiums shaped like doughnuts and toward baseball-only stadiums with so-called
throwback designs."); see also David Armstrong, 49ers on the Move? Economics, Foot-
ball-Only Stadiums Rarely Pay Off for Cities, Experts Say, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 2006, at
B4; Bengals have Sold 20 Percent of Seat Licenses in Three Weeks, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Jan. 9, 1997, at 4D (discussing the city of Cincinnati's construction of separate
ballparks for the Reds and Bengals); Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act
of 1999: Hearing on S.952 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 11, 14
(1999) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter of Pa.) ("[Pennsylvania is] looking at four
new [publicly funded] stadiums. Two are under construction now in western
Pennsylvania for the Steelers and the Pirates, and two are in the immediate offer-
ing for the Phillies and the Eagles.").
44. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 286 (commenting that cities have moved
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MLB teams do so today (the Florida Marlins, Minnesota Twins and
Oakland Athletics). 45 By 2012, this number is expected to drop
down to one, as both the city of Minneapolis and Miami-Dade
County are in the process of building new baseball-only stadiums.
46
III. CONCLUSION
Even before American cities began to publicly fund baseball
stadiums, owning a MLB team was considered to be a very lucrative
investment.47 Historically teams such as the New York Yankees have
earned a rate of return double that of a diversified investment port-
folio. 48 In addition, teams such as the Brooklyn Dodgers have
turned a profit on the sale of their franchise even during America's
darkest financial periods such as the Great Depression.
49
Today, in an era in which most cities provide their MLB club-
owners with publicly funded stadiums and increasingly luxurious
ones at that, MLB club-owners are financially doing better than ever
- thus, calling into doubt any fair market need for subsidies.
The Great Recession of 2008-09 has wiped out more than fifty
percent of the common American's savings, left the nation with an
unemployment rate that exceeds 8.5%, and left states such as Cali-
fornia on the brink of bankruptcy.5 0 In this economic climate, pro-
45. See Marlins Ballpark, Ballparks of Baseball, http://
www.ballparksofbaseball.com/future/MiamiBallpark.htm; Target Field, Ballparks
of Baseball, http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/future/Target Field.htm; Cisco
Field, Ballparks of Baseball, http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/future/
CiscoField.htm.
46. See Target Field, Ballparks of Baseball, http://
www.ballparksofbaseball.com/future/TargetField.htm (stating April 2010 as the
planned opening month for the new Twins stadium); Marlins Ballpark, Ballparks
of Baseball http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/future/MiamiBallpark.htm (stat-
ing a proposed opening in April 2012 for the new Marlins facility).
47. See Sports and the City, supra note 2, at 45-46.
48. See SPORTS ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 1-2 (showing that since 1915 own-
ing the New York Yankees has provided, on average, twice as large a rate of return
as owning a diversified portfolio).
49. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 285 (noting that the Brooklyn Dodgers
franchise value upon sale increased from $200,000 in 1912 to $4,200,000 in 1950).
50. See California City Moves Closer to Bankruptcy Filing, BLOOMBERG.COM, http:/
/www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ajxCNoS2DEzE (last vis-
ited May 1, 2009) (noting the causes of possible bankruptcy in California); see also
Socio-Economics History Blog, Calfornia Economy Near Collapse - Pension Funds Close
to Bankruptcy, http://socioecohistory.wordpress.com/2009/02/02/california-econ-
omy-near-collapse-pension-funds-close-to-bankruptcy/ (last visited May 1, 2009).
Nonetheless, MLB club-owners such as Jeffrey Loria of the Florida Marlins have
spent recent months continuing to push forward with their demands for new pub-
licly financed ballparks, and communities such as Miami-Dade County have contin-
ued to succumb to baseball club-owners' stadium demands. See Sports and the City,
supra note 2, at 35-37; see also Brian Hamacher & Todd Wright, Play Ball! Marlins
[Vol. 16: p. 257
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viding public subsidies to already wealthy MLB club-owners seems
all the more controversial.
U.S. Senator Arlen Specter (former R-PA), in his 1999 testi-
mony before Congress, described the way in which MLB club-own-
ers use their monopoly power to obtain stadium subsidies as
"legalized extortion. '" 51 While this is a strong claim, there is an ele-
ment of truth to it: American cities would not subsidize sports stadi-
ums if not for the monopolist control that MLB has over the total
supply of professional baseball teams.
Thus, now is the time to change the relationship between Ma-
jor League Baseball and the American city into something more
palatable to the local taxpayer. Either the U.S. government must
curb the monopoly power of MLB as exercised by its club-owners to
obtain publicly funded stadiums, or it must pass a bill to protect
American taxpayers from inequitable stadium financing
arrangements.
In either event, some action is needed to better align the bene-
fits and burdens of building new MLB stadiums. Otherwise,
America's national pastime may begin to lose its pristine image in
the eyes of many taxpayers and fans. And, once lost, the glory of
Major League Baseball might disappear forever.
Stadium Wins Approval, NBCSPoRTS.COM, Mar. 24, 2009, http://www.nbcmiami.
com/sports/baseball/marlins/Last-Pitch-For-New-Park.html; Marlins' New Stadium
Approved, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2009, at E04, available at http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032403078.html.
51. Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999: Hearing on S.952
Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 11, 14 (1999) (statement of Sen.
Arlen Specter of Pa.).
2009] 265
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